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JOHN BURIDAN AND MARSILIUS OF INGHEN ON CONSEQUENCES
E. P. Bos, Leiden
I Introduction.
The purpose of this paper is to fill in a very small detail on the map of
the history of Medieval Logic. By making a comparison between two aspects
of the tracts on consequences by John Buridan and Marsilius of Inghen I shall
try to specify the relation between both philosophers and by discussing two
points of difference my aim is to clarify the positions of each logician.
My essay has its starting-point in the well-known work of the German
scholar Gerhard Ritter, entitled Marsilius von Inghen und die Okkamistische
Schule in Deutschland, Heidelberg, 1921 . While discussing the personal
relationships of Marsilius, Ritter remarks: "Wahrscheinlich ist dagegen seine
persönliche Bekanntschaft mit Johannes Buridanus, von dem er als Logiker und
Physiker so vieles übernommen hat: er bezeichnet ihn gelegentlich und zwar
mit Nachdruck (passionatus) als magister meus" . Ritter notices Carl Prantl's
opinion, that in his works of logic (such as: the Commentary of the Prior
Analytics of Aristotle and his Parva Logicalia Marsilius is very much dependent
on others: Peter of Spain, William of Ockham and, especially, John Buridan .
But as regards the tract on consequences, Ritter remarks: "Grössere Selb-
ständigkeit entwickelt der Abschnitt De consequentiis, was auch dessen auf-
4
fallende Verbreitung erklaren mag" .
The two points of difference between John and Marsilius I intend to dis-
cuss in this paper are both to be found in fundamental parts of the tracts in
question: the first is the difference in their definition of the concept of
consequential, the second, and perhaps more interesting point» is Marsilius'
* I sincerely wish to thank Prof. De Rijk (Leiden) for the encouragement
and advice I received while writing this essay, and Mr. E. P. Kwaadgras
(Delft) for his corrections of the English.
1) G. Ritter, Studien zur Spät Scholastik I. Marsilius von Inghen und die
Okkamistisohe Schule in Deutschland* Heidelberg* 1921» in: Sitz. ber.
der Heidelberger Ak. der Wiss., Philos.-Hist. Klasse, (4) 1921.
2) Ritter, 1921, p. 11 (cp. note 1).
3) Ib., p. 49 ff (cp. note 1).
4) Ib. p. 5o (cp. note 1).
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rejection of the aonsequentia ut- nuno (consequence as of now) in contradistinc-
tion with Buridan's position. This last aspect forms part of the chapters on
the division of consequence in both tracts.
There are other fundamental differences between the two tracts. For
instance, there is a striking difference in the composition between the two
tracts, in the degree to which both organize their tracts: Buridan's is
presented much more explicitly as an axiomatic-deductive system than Marsilius'
work. I will not discuss these questions here, however.
The texts I use are the following: as regards Buridan Professor Hubien
from Liege was kind enough to give to me the provisional proof-sheets of his
forthcoming critical edition of the tract in the series called Philosophes
médiévaux. This edition will be based not only on incunabula (which alone are
mentioned by Faral) , but also on manuscripts.
As far as Marsilius is concerned, I am myself preparing a critical edition,
with a commentary, of his PQPVa Logioalia. This edition will differ substan-
tially from the incunabula, and early printed editions, which are all abbfeviata.
The discussion of the 1consequence as of now', for example, is not found in the
abbreviate..
As for the dates of the tracts, nothing is certain. Professor Hubien con-
cludes tentatively that Buridan's tract was composed in 1335 .
If we follow Ritter, Marsilius of Inghen came to the University of Paris
in 1359 and stayed there until 1379 . It seems that he composed his PaPVa
Logiaalia in his Parisian period, and not during his later sojourn in Heidel-
berg. There are no clues for a more specific date in the manuscripts. The
0
oldest is dated 1382 . Buridan, as Faral thinks, died in 1358, so he and
Marsilius could not have met personally, but evidence might possibly be found
in the manuscripts that Buridan did not, in fact, die until some time later.
In that case Faral would not have to explain away some 'data' given in the
9
manuscripts .
For the subject in question none of the other works on logic by Buridan
and Marsilius will have to be discussed directly. The Commentaries on
Aristotle's Prior Analytics of both logicians have no direct bearing on our
subject* neither does BuridanTs De syllogismis.
5) E. Faral, Jean Buridan., Notes SUP les manuscrits_, les éditions et le
contenu de ses ouvrages, in: Arch. d1Hist. doctr. et litt, du M.-A. (XV).
1946, p. 1-53.
6} Johannes Buridanus, De eonsequentiis, critical edition with an introduction
by H. Hubien (prov. title).
7) G. Ritter, 1921, p. 11 ff (cp. note 1).
8} MS München, Clm 4385» f. 45r ff.
9) E. Faral, Jean Buridan* Maitre es arts de l'université de Paris * 195o.
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II On the definition of consequence.
As can be gathered from the table of contents , Marsilius starts his ex-
position with a definition of consequence. Buridan1s definition, on the other
hand, is found after two preliminary chapters. I shall quote both definitions :
Buridan has : "Consequent ia est propositie hypothetica ex antécédente et
consequente designans antecedens esse antecedens et consequens esse consequens;
haec autem designatio fit per hanc dictionem T si' vel per hanc dictionem 1ergoT
aut equivalentem"
When Buridan speaks about consequentia, he means a consequent-La vera
which occurs if "ilia propositio est antecedens ad aliam quae sic se habet ad
illam aliam quod irapossibïle est qualitercumque ipsa significat sic esse quin
qualitercumque ilia alia signi f icat sic sit ipsis sïrnul propos itis"
Marsilius defines consequentia buna sen Vera: "Consequeatia bona est
oratio sic se habens quod impossibile est sic esse qualitercumque per antecedens
secundura eius totalem significationem pronunc significatur quin ita sit qualiter-
curaque per consequens significatur secundum eius totalem significationem pro-
„13
n une
In the first place one might observe that both logicians give an inten-
sional definition of a good consequence. This is one of the possibilities of
defining a consequence, as can be concluded from the list Paul of Venice gives
in his Logica Magna (which is printed also in Pinborg's book, Logik und Semantik
im Mittelalter- ). Moody was only able to consult the ineunabulwn for his
study; this version gives an extensional definition . It should be said,
however, that in defining the material consequence Buridan again gives the
extensional formula , whereas Marsilius uses the intensional definition when-
ever he defines the several types of consequences.
A striking difference between Marsilius and Buridan can be seen, in the
framework within which each philosopher gives the definition. Marsilius, as
I said above, begins his tract with the definition of consequence, whereas
in Buridan's work it is preceded by an analysis of the truth-values of pro-
positions and of their causae veritatis . Using the notions of supposition
IG) See p. 69 of this paper.
11) Ch. 3, ed. Hubien (cp. note 6).
12} Ch. 3, ed. Hubien (cp. note 6).
13) MS Vienna, CVP 5162, f. Io7r.
14) J. Pinborg, Logik und Semantik im Mittelalter. Ein Überblick, Stuttgart,
1972, p. 2o5 ff.
15) E. A. Moody, Truth and Consequence in Medieval Logio, Amsterdam, 1953,
p. 66.
16) Ch. 4, ed. Hubien (cp. note 6).
17) Ch. 1, ed. Hubien (cp. note 6).
18) Ch. 2, ed. Hubien (cp. note 6).
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and ampliation of terms, the causes of truth play an important role in Buridan's
exposition, as well as in the seventeen conclusiones he mentions in chapter
VIII of his first book.
Mars ilius' tract starts immediately with an exposition on the definition,
in which supposition does not play a major role. More than Buridan he points
to the implications of the definition.
The most explicit difference between the two definitions are the final
words in them. In Buridan we find: ipsis simul propositie or illis simul
formatis. In Marsilius there is nothing of the sort, instead we find: secundum
eins totalem significationem pronunc. John1s reason for ment ioning the above
words in his definition is, that the fol lowing consequence is a correct one :
ornnis homo cup-pit* ergo aliquis homo currit. A definition without the ad-
ditions cited would not cover this correct consequence, because the antecedent
can be true without the consequent being true, indeed, even without the
existence of the consequent as such.
This requirement of existence is felt to be necessary by John Buridan.
19
He also adopts this requirement as a counterfactual condition to exclude the
possibility that, if all propositions of a kind, e.g. all negative propositions,
are annihilated, the consequent can not be formed at all.
The requirement of existence is retained by Buridan, also when he has
transformed his provisional extensional definition into an intensional one.
In this aspect Buridan has set the example for many later medieval and post-
medieval logicians as is shown by Miss E. J. Ashworth in her excellent work
Language and Logic in the Post-Medieval Period
In Marsilius' tract, as we saw, we find another phrase, which is lacking
in Buridan's. It runs: secundum eius totalem significationem pronunc.
This formula has been introduced by Marsilius because a definition of the
valid consequence without this addition would give validity to the following
inference: 'homo cuPTit, ergo asinus ouvrit*. The expression 'significabile'
or 'signifioatur* is an ampliative one. It can be equalled with Jpoteet
significari'. In view of the inference proposed, if, as Marsilius puts it»
the signification of "ass" is added to the signification of "man", the con-
sequent follows from the antecedent analytically. Marsilius says: ponatu?
casus, which suggests that this argument is possible within the framework of
the game of obligation, and in fact, the argument gives the case of "change
19) The 'ablativus absolutus'.
20) E. J. Ashworth, Language and Logic in the Post-Medieval Period, Dordrecht,
1974, p. 122 ff.
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of imposition of terms, an issue discussed by Marsilius in his tract De
21
obligations-bus
Another reason for adding the formula is that without it , the inference
'omnïs homo cupritf ergo Sortes euprit' would be a valid consequence. And
this is impossible, according to Marsilius, in the case that Socrates is dead.
Therefore the definition should not comprise this consequence. This question
forms a prelude to Marsilius' discussion on the material "consequence as of
now", which will be the subject of our next chapter» In this part, which only
treats of the definition of consequence, Marsilius says that ormis homo ewnpit
only means ormem hominem currere, and not Softem cupreve. It is of no concern
if Socrates is dead. These significata, Marsilius adds, can exist natuPaliter
loquendo.
There exist several medieval commentaries on Marsilius' tract on conse-
quences. I myself was able to consult nine of the eleven that I know of. On
this Particular point the commentaries are of no help. Some of them do not
even mention the formula added, let alone comment on it. Some others, includ-
22ing the oldest and best one , do not endeavour so much to interpret Marsilius;
they rather use him to express their own views. Commentaries on the abbreviate
gloss on our formula as follows: sef^unduin modum signification's quern termini
aetu habent
24
We learn from Miss Ashworth's book that several post-medieval logicians
use the same formula , but for slightly different reasons , viz . to encounter
the difficulties arising from the arbitrary connection between the proposition
as sentence-token and the state of affairs to which the words refer.
Ill __ On the division of consequence.
In Buridan' s exposition as well as in Marsilius1 tract the chapter on
definition is followed by one on the division of consequence. In chapter IV
of Buridan' s tract we find the following division:
, forraalis
<
L U L LUü 1 J. S
,simpliciter loquendo
materialis^
21) MS Vienna, CVP 5162, f. 14or.
22) MS Erfurt, Q 278, F. 57v ff.
23) Clarissimi philosophi Marsilii de ingen textus dialectices de suppositio-
nïbus, ampliationibus, appellationibus, aliénâtionibus, restrictionibus et
consequentiis abbreviatus....cum solitis questionibus ac sophismatibus
perutili brevitate contextis....Viennae, 1512 (C.Pschlacher), f. 2olv ff.
24) Ashworth, 1974, p. 126 (cp. note 22).
And in Marsilius7 work we find
. syllogistica
formalis <^_
non-syllogisticaconsequentia /
^materialis <^  ? - simpliciter dicta
A first point of difference here is that Marsilius identifies the oonse-
quentia formalis syllogistica with the syllogism. The syllogism is not treated
of by him in this tract, but we are referred to Aristotle's discussions in the
Prior Analytics and those by Peter of Spain in his Tractatus . Buridan does
not give a subdivision of the formal consequence here» but in the next two
chapters of his tract on consequences he deals with the syllogism, first the
assertorial, then the modal syllogism. In his chapter 3 Buridan explicitly
mentions the syllogism as a form of consequence . The only work of Marsilius
relevant to our subject is his Commentary on the Prior Analytics of Aristotle,
but there, as a commentator on Aristotle, he does not define the syllogism as
a form of consequentia. Anyway, in both logicians we meet the fourteenth-
century tendency to make the syllogism a form of consequence along with
others
Most striking is the fact that Marsilius does not accept the aonsequ&ntia.
ut nunc (consequence as of now) in his division. He says that he will not give
a subdivision of his own as regards the material consequence: "tertia divisio
est de consequentia materiali, sed propter huiusmodi membrorum divisionem et
29
subdivisionem prolixitatem divitans ipsam delinquo11 * Indeed, nowhere else
can such a subdivision be found. Marsilius defines the "consequence as of now11,
which will be rejected by him, as follows: "Dicitur consequentia ut nunc bona
ex eo quod in rebus se habentibus ut nunc se habent, quod non potest sic esse
sicut significatur per antecedens quin ita sit sicut per consequens significa-
tur. Exemplum ut si Sor est albus: 'Sor survit, ergo album cmcyit1." Compare
3o
Buridan's definition : "quae non sunt simpliciter loquendo bonae, quia pos-
sibile est antecedens esse verum sine consequente, sed sunt bonae ut nunc,
quia impossibile est rebus omnino se habentibus ut nunc se habent antecedens
esse verum sine consequente".
Buridan, hereafter, proceeds to the reduction of the "consequence as of
25) MS Vienna 5162, f. Io8r ff.
26) Called 'Sivwmtie' by Marsilius* Cp. Peter of Spain, Traetatus, called
afterwards Suminule logicales, ed. De Rijk, Assen 1972, ch. III.
27) Liber III, ch. 1 (éd. Hubien) (cp. note 6).
28) Pinborg, 1972, p. 169 (cp. note 14).
29) MS Vienna, CVP 5162, f. loSv.
30) Ch. 4, ed. Hubien (cp. note 6).
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now" to a formal one. In treating material consequences Buridan always applies
such a reduction. He also extends the notion of a consequence whose truth-
value is dependent on situations of a particular time, to the material Gonse-
quentia ut tune (consequence as of then), and to the future, to the so-called
consequentie promissive. Legitimation of this extension is, again, the pos-
sibility of the reduction to a formal consequence by way of a true proposition.
Marsilius, objecting to such a consequence, remarks that the very same
people who accept a "consequence as of now" say that only a valid consequence
is a consequence. Nevertheless they call the "consequence as of now" no real
consequence, because it simplicités loquendo is no valid consequence. We
hear the echo of Buridan. Marsilius is not even prepared to call the "conse-
quence as of now" a consequence by equivocation.
While discussing the definition of consequence we have already seen that
the consequence ormis homo curritf ergo Sortes currit is not considered valid
by Marsilius, viz. in the case that Socrates is dead. Here also the validity
of the consequence depends on the situation of a particular time. This situa-
tion can be the existence of a subject in question, of the qualification of
a certain subject at a particular time. The modus ponens is not valid without
qualification.
In his chapter on the rules (régule) of material consequence Marsilius
returns to this question: arguing from a so-called "higher" distributive term
to a "lower" one, in the affirmative or the negative, is possible only with a
subject remaining constant (cum constantia subieeti} . This constancy is
expressed in the antecedent, and so these reduced consequences can not any more
be properly called "material consequences".
As far as I know, Marsilius is one of the few prominent medieval logi-
cians who explicitly reject the "consequence as of now", although this form
of consequence has always been treated with suspicion, e.g. by Ockham , In
34
spite of what Bochenski states , the "consequence as of now kept a place in
the systems of logicians after Paul of Venice.
Here I want to mention Albert of Saxony, the pupil of Buridan, but only
to give a specimen of the discussion about our form of consequence within
Buridan's circle. Albert knows of objections against the "consequence as of
then", but he defends this consequence on the occasion of a particular
31) Régula 6a. The counterpart in Régule 7a. Cp. also Régule 26a and 34a.
32) Like Marsilius: Ralph Strode, Nicolaus Drukken de Dacia.
33) W. & M. Kneale, The Development of Logic, Oxford 1962, p. 289 ff.
34) I.«. Bochenski, Formale Logik, München, 1956, p. 243. See also: Ashworth,
1974, p. 13o ff.(cp. note 2o).
argument against it . It has been said that the fol lowing consequence is in-
valid: orme ew?rens est as-inus3 ormïs homo est curyenst ergo ornn-is homo est
asïnus. This consequence is said to be invalid because an impossible conse-
quent follows from a possible antecedent , which is an impos sible inference
even following Albert's lines. But Albert responds that the antecedent is
also impossible because the parts of this copulative proposition are ïns
sibi-les (taken separately they are possible, indeed). Albert concludes that
this reduced ut nunc consequentïa is valid
Again, this case has only been put forward by me as an example.
We do not have much secondary literature on the subject I have discussed.
Even the commentaries fail to give an interpretation of Marsilius' arguments
which is relevant to the topic.
My conclusion must be that Marsilius' rejection of the "consequence as of
now" also permeates his treatment of the definition of consequence, while this
same type of material consequence still kept its place in Buridan's work and
in the work of his pupil, Albert of Saxony.
35) Albert of Saxony, Perutilis logica, Venetiis, 1522, p. 45vb.
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